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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Weston Hudson appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction entered upon his conditional guilty plea to one count of felony possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Mr. Hudson asserts that the district court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable, 
warrantless investigatory detention and the subsequent unreasonable, warrantless 
search of a van. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Hudson had committed the 
crimes of drug-trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine, felony, in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 37-2732B(a)(4), and injury to a jail, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-7018.1 
(R., pp.15-16.) After a preliminary hearing, Mr. Hudson was bound over to the district 
court, and the State filed an Information charging him with the above crimes. 
(R., pp.42-45, 50-52.) Mr. Hudson then filed a motion to suppress asserting that the 
warrantless search in his case violated his constitutional rights because no well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement justified the search, and thus the 
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search should be suppressed. 
(R., pp.71-72.) The State filed an objection to Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, as well 
as a memorandum in opposition. (R., pp.73-74, 76-83.) After the district court 
requested that the parties submit additional briefing, Mr. Hudson filed a brief in support 
1 At the jail, Mr. Hudson shattered the booking window when he kicked it. (R., p.43.) 
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of the motion to suppress, as well as points and authorities in regard to the motion, and 
the State filed a second memorandum in opposition. (R., pp.84, 92-119.) 
The district court subsequently conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.138-40.) Before the district court heard testimony, the State objected on the 
basis that Mr. Hudson did not have standing to challenge the warrantless search of the 
van which produced the evidence obtained by the police. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.3, L.22 
- p .4, L.2.) 
Officer Peter Klepich of the Idaho Falls Police Department testified that, on the 
day of Mr. Hudson's arrest, he was driving down Maple Street in Idaho Falls while on a 
routine patrol. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.4, L.10- p.5, L.16.) He described the area as a 
"fairly high crime area." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.5, Ls.22-23.) While patrolling down 
Maple Street, Officer Klepich saw Mr. Hudson and another male look over their 
shoulders, keep their heads down, and keep their backs to him as he drove by them. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.5, L.17 - p.6, L.3.) He characterized the behavior as "indicative 
of someone not wanting to be observed or recognized." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.8, Ls.16-
17.) After driving past them, Officer Klepich turned around and drove by again, where 
"a similar thing happened." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.6, Ls.4-6.) The officer turned around 
a second time, and the two subjects were gone when he drove by next. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.6, Ls.6-7.) 
Officer Klepich testified that he then continued down Maple Street and, when he 
approached the intersection of Ridge Street, noticed the two subjects were running 
down the road on Ridge Street. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.8, L.20 - p.9, L.2.) The officer 
turned down Ridge Street, and the two subjects disappeared at the apartment complex 
on the corner of Ridge Street and Pine Street. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.9, Ls.3-7.) 
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Officer Klepich parked his patrol car near the apartment complex and took a look 
around on foot because "the behavior of the two subjects was pretty suspicious at this 
point." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.9, Ls.8-15.) He then located Mr. Hudson crouching 
behind a planter in front of the apartment complex. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.9, Ls.15-17, 
p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.9.) Officer Klepich asked Mr. Hudson what he was doing, "and he 
jumped up into a standing position and said 'What? There's nothing going on here,' 
something to that effect." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.11, Ls.10-12.) The officer testified that 
Mr. Hudson was perspiring, looking up and down the road, and trying to walk away. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.11, Ls.13-16.) 
Officer Klepich testified that, at that point, he did not know who Mr. Hudson was 
or what he was doing. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.11, Ls.17-18.) He decided to detain 
Mr. Hudson, and then handcuffed Mr. Hudson and advised him he was being detained 
until the officer could sort out what was happening. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.11, Ls.18-
21.) He described Mr. Hudson's behavior as "indicative of someone that was trying to 
leave." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.12, Ls.8-12.) Officer Klepich did not read Mr. Hudson his 
Miranda rights2 after handcuffing him. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.13, Ls.1-3.) 
Officer Klepich testified that Mr. Hudson was Mirandized at some point after the officer 
found out who Mr. Hudson was and that he had a warrant, but the officer could not 
recall whether he or any other officer personally Mirandized Mr. Hudson. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.13, Ls.4-22.) Officer Klepich then found out from dispatch that Mr. Hudson had 
a warrant, and he performed a Terry frisk3 on Mr. Hudson. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.14, 
Ls.3-11.) He found a knife on Mr. Hudson's person, but no wallet or identification. 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.14, Ls.12-15.) He did not remember if Mr. Hudson was wearing 
a hat. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.14, Ls.16-17.) OfficerKlepich subsequently took 
Mr. Hudson to Officer Jessica Marley's patrol car. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.14, L.21 -
p.15, L.7.) 
The officer testified that dispatch then called him and advised that somebody had 
called about a van that the police should take a look at. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.15, 
Ls. 10-13.) Officer Klepich and Officer Garron Kelly responded to the request to inspect 
the van after Mr. Hudson was placed in Officer Marley's car. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.15, 
L.23 - p.16, L.14.) He knocked on the door of the residence next to where the van was 
parked, but the woman who answered the door stated that the van did not belong to 
her. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.17, L.15-p.18, L.17.) The van was parked on Maple Street 
with its doors closed, and the officers looked into the van from outside. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.16, L.24-p.17, L.3.) Looking through the passenger's side window of the van, 
Officer Klepich saw an unzipped camera case in the center console in the space 
between the seats, and a glass pipe that had a white residue in it protruding from the 
case. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.17, Ls.4-12.) He stated that the glass pipe, "from my 
training and experience, appeared to be drug paraphernalia, like a methamphetamine 
pipe." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.17, Ls.13-14.) 
Officer Klepich testified that he opened the van's door after seeing the 
methamphetamine pipe, because the pipe "was in plain view." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.9.) He had information that the van was somehow connected to 
Mr. Hudson, but no evidence of that at the time. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.19, Ls.13-15.) 
Inside the van, the officers found another pipe, some scales, a large baggie of what 
appeared to be methamphetamine, and a wallet containing Mr. Hudson's identification 
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card. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.19, L.16 - p.20, L.3.) Officer Kelly took pictures as they 
pulled out the items. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.21, Ls.8-24.) A hat was in some of the 
plctures. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.27, Ls.10-12, 22-22.) 
Officer Klepich testified that he then went back to Mr. Hudson to talk about the 
van, and Mr. Hudson "stated he had walked there and had nothing to do with any 
vehicle." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.20, Ls.4-25.) Officer Klepich did not document in his 
report that he had read Mr. Hudson his Miranda rights, because "it was inconsequential 
... no information given from him to me that was of anything of consequence to the 
case." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.22, Ls.19-25, p.23, Ls.18-21.) Although the officer was 
not certain he had Mirandized Mr. Hudson, he had a habit of Mirandizing people when 
he had them in handcuffs and was questioning them. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.23, Ls.6-
9.) The second male had been detained by this point, and Officer Klepich testified that 
the second male stated that he and Mr. Hudson had driven there in the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.23, L.22 - p.24, L.17.) 
On cross-examination, Officer Klepich testified that he had not yet decided to 
arrest Mr. Hudson when he detained him, and that he had not observed any actual laws 
being broken at that point, but only "some suspicious behavior." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.32, Ls.12-21.) He described the two subjects' behavior of putting their heads down 
and turning their back to him when he drove by as "the type of behavior of someone that 
wouldn't want to be recognized or be observed." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.33, Ls.6-24.) 
However, Officer Klepich was not concerned when he found that the two subjects had 
left, but assumed they had just gone into a house. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.34, Ls.2-11.) 
He was concerned when he saw the two subjects running down the road, because they 
were not wearing jogging clothes and did not appear to be exercising. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
5 
2012, p.34, Ls.16-18.) Officer Klepich testified, "Fleeing the area is what it appeared to 
be to me." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.34, Ls.19-20.) After the officer walked around the 
apartment complex and saw Mr. Hudson by the planter, he was concerned about why 
Mr. Hudson was trying to hide from him. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.35, L.14 - p.36, L.2.) 
Officer Klepich detained and handcuffed Mr. Hudson because he was concerned that 
Mr. Hudson would try to run again, and "[b]ecause, at this point, the combination of his 
behavior on Maple Street, running down Ridge Street [and] hiding behind the planter at 
the apartment complex warranted a little further investigation." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.36, Ls.10-19.) 
Officer Klepich also testified that he believed that he had read Mr. Hudson his 
Miranda rights, because it was ingrained into him through training and it was something 
he did on a regular basis. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.37, Ls.14-23.) He did not document it 
because nothing of pertinence regarding the arrest came from talking with Mr. Hudson. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.37, L.23 - p.38, L.4.) Mr. Hudson had "denied being in the 
vehicle" and "stated that he had walked there." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.38, Ls.6-8.) 
Specifically, Officer Klepich asked him if he had driven the van there, and Mr. Hudson 
responded "No," told the officer it was not his van, and stated he had walked there to 
see his child at his girlfriend's house. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.42, L.22 - p.43, L.15.) 
The officer testified that the van was parked directly in front of the address where 
he had contacted the female 911 caller who called dispatch about the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.39, Ls.7-13.) Officer Klepich ran the van's license plates through 
dispatch, and it came back to a person different from Mr. Hudson, whom he later 
learned was Mr. Hudson's grandmother. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.40, Ls.7-22.) Officer 
Klepich also testified that it could have been possible that he shuffled through the items 
6 
from the van before deciding that there needed to be photographs taken. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.41, L.21 - p.42, L.5.) The wallet was right beside the methamphetamine pipe 
and the zip-up camera case when Officer Klepich went into the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.42, Ls.6-21.) By the time the second male subject told Officer Klepich that he 
and Mr. Hudson had arrived in the van, the officer had already found things in the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.43, L.24 - p.44, L.5.) 
On examination by the district court, Officer Klepich testified that in the initial 
contact with Mr. Hudson, he heard something on the other side of the planter, leaned 
over, looked down and asked, "Hey, man, what are you doing?" (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.44, Ls.13-24.) Mr. Hudson then jumped up and stated, "What? There's nothing going 
on here." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.44, L.25 - p.45, L.1.) Mr. Hudson was sweating and 
nervous, and he looked up and down the road and acted as if he wanted to walk away 
from the officer. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.45, Ls.2-4.) Officer Klepich went around the 
planter, stated, "Hey, man, you're doing some suspicious stuff, and I'm going to detain 
you until I can sort out what's going on and what you're doing," and then handcuffed 
Mr. Hudson. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.45, Ls.5-9.) Mr. Hudson stated that he had no 
identification on him, but he told the officer who he was. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.45, 
Ls.10-15.) When the district court asked Officer Klepich whether the two male subjects 
were "running when you saw them, or did they see you and run," he testified, "They 
were running when I saw them." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.45, Ls.21-23.) 
On redirect examination, Officer Klepich testified, "if you're looking over your 
shoulder and then putting your head down and then moving your body to keep your 
back to me," that was suspicious behavior in his opinion. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.46, 
Ls.21-25.) However, Officer Klepich, when asked if a person keeps their head down if 
7 
they are shy or lacking in confidence, replied "I guess they could." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.47, Ls.7-12.) The officer did not distinctly remember whether he had Mirandized 
Mr. Hudson. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.47, Ls.16-19.) 
Claudia Rowe, Mr. Hudson's grandmother, testified that she owned the van, but 
that it was not her primary vehicle and that "[e]verybody in the family uses it." 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.48, L.21 - p.50, L.15.) The keys for the van were either kept in 
the van or on a microwave, and Ms. Rowe's daughter Betty Hudson was in charge of 
keeping track of the van. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.50, Ls.16-21.) Ms. Rowe had 
given Ms. Hudson authority to allow others to drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.50, 
L.25 - p.51, L.2.) She testified that Mr. Hudson had driven the van before. (Tr., Sept. 
11, 2012, p.51, Ls.3-4.) While Ms. Rowe testified at the preliminary hearing that she did 
not want Mr. Hudson to drive the van because she thought he had a warrant, but she 
"never told him that he couldn't drive it." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.51, Ls.8-18.) Ms. Rowe 
was "pretty sure" that Ms. Hudson had not told Mr. Hudson he could not drive the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.51, Ls.19-21.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Rowe testified that her van had been seized by law 
enforcement, and that prior to the van being seized, she did not know that Mr. Hudson 
had a warrant for his arrest. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.53, L.14 - p.54, L.2.) Ms. Rowe 
also admitted that, at the preliminary hearing, she testified that Mr. Hudson was not 
allowed to take the van because he had a warrant, and that she did not want him to 
drive the van because she did not want it to be impounded. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.56, 
L.17 - p.57, L.2.) However, on redirect examination Ms. Rowe testified that she never 
told anyone that Mr. Hudson was not allowed to drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.57, Ls.14-19.) 
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Ms. Hudson, Mr. Hudson's mother, testified that she drove the van all the time, 
that other people drove the van, and that "it was kind of a family vehicle." (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.58, L.10 - p.59, L.25.) Mr. Hudson used the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.60, 
Ls.1-2.) Ms. Rowe, Ms. Hudson's mother, never told her that Mr. Hudson could not use 
the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.60, Ls.9-11.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Hudson testified that she was not present for every 
conversation between Ms. Rowe and Mr. Hudson, and she would not have known if 
Ms. Rowe told him he could not drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.60, Ls.17-23.) 
She knew that Mr. Hudson had a warrant out for his arrest, but could not recall telling 
Ms. Rowe and did not know if Ms. Rowe knew about the warrant. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.60, L.24 - p.61, L.6.) Ms. Rowe knew that if Mr. Hudson were arrested driving a 
vehicle, the vehicle would be impounded. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.62, Ls.11-17.) When 
asked if she still gave Mr. Hudson authority to drive the van while knowing that it could 
be impounded, Ms. Rowe testified, "He was never specifically told. It was - the keys 
were on the microwave." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.63, Ls.8-12.) She knew that Ms. Rowe 
would not want her van impounded. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.63, Ls.13-20.) 
Lecresia Sandoval, Mr. Hudson's fiancee and the mother of his child, testified 
that they were not together on the day of the arrest. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.64, L.12 -
p.65, L.16.) She made an anonymous telephone call to law enforcement stating that 
Mr. Hudson had been at her house and that she wanted an officer to check out the van 
she thought he had used. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.65, L.17 - p.66, L.3.) Ms. Sandoval 
called law enforcement because she was upset with Mr. Hudson. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.66, Ls.4-6.) She recognized the van from being around Mr. Hudson, and believed that 
it belonged to his grandmother. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.66, Ls.4-16.) A couple minutes 
9 
after her first call to law enforcement, Ms. Sandoval called law enforcement again and 
told them she did not want them to come anymore. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.66, L.17 -
p.67, L.3.) 
Ms. Sandoval testified that law enforcement nonetheless arrived at her 
residence, and that Officer Klepich walked up to her while she was sitting outside. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.67, Ls.4-13.) Officer Klepich had a hat and a wallet in his hand, 
and asked if he could search the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.67, Ls.13-14.) 
Ms. Sandoval told him that the van was not hers, and Officer Klepich then went to look 
around the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.67, Ls.10-16.) She testified that the wallet and 
hat from the photographs of the items from the van appeared to be the wallet and hat 
Officer Klepich had in his hand. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.68, Ls.9-18.) Officer Klepich 
circled the van a couple times, and then got into the van through the passenger door, 
and it looked like he was moving things inside the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.68, L.19 -
p.69, L.8.) Only then did another officer join Officer Klepich. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.69, 
Ls.9-11.) Ms. Sandoval saw Officer Klepich leave and come back to the van several 
times, but she did not ever see him exit the van with the wallet and hat in his hand. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.69, Ls.18-23.) 
On cross-examination, Ms. Sandoval testified that she had become engaged to 
Mr. Hudson about six months after the date of his arrest. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.71, 
Ls.8-16.) When she first called 911, she told the dispatcher that she wanted somebody 
to check out the van, and that she believed there might have been something inside it. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.71, Ls.17-23.) She also told the 911 dispatcher that her child's 
father was at her residence, and that an officer drove by. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.71, 
L.24 - p.72, L.8.) She did not recall telling the dispatcher that Mr. Hudson took off 
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running, and did not see Mr. Hudson when he left. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.72, Ls.6-12.) 
She may have told the dispatcher that she was afraid of Mr. Hudson, but did not recall 
stating that he had threatened to hurt her in the past or that she was sure that the 
officers would find something in the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.72, Ls.13-25.) 
Officer Klepich had not yet shown up when she made the second call to law 
enforcement. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.73, Ls.8-10.) Officer Klepich was the only officer 
who initially showed up and asked about the van, and Ms. Sandoval had not seen from 
where he got the wallet and hat. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.74, Ls.4-15.) She had 
previously seen Mr. Hudson wearing the hat that morning. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.74, 
Ls.18-25.) 
Following the testimony, the district court heard argument from the parties. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.75, L.1 - p.93, L.17.) Officer Marley then testified that she 
assisted Officer Klepich after he informed her that he had detained Mr. Hudson. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.94, L.20 - p.97, L.25.) Officer Marley had Mr. Hudson in the 
back of her patrol car while Officer Klepich did some other things regarding the 
investigation. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.98, Ls.4-8.) She intended to transport Mr. Hudson 
to jail, based on Mr. Hudson being arrested on a warrant. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.98, 
Ls.15-24.) When Officer Klepich came back to Officer Marley's car, they had a 
conversation and discussed giving Mr. Hudson his Miranda warnings. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.99, L.14 - p.100, L.2.) She testified that she heard Officer Klepich gave 
Mr. Hudson his Miranda warnings while Mr. Hudson was seated in the back of her patrol 
car. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.100, Ls.3-13.) Only after Mr. Hudson was Mirandized did 
she hear Officer Klepich ask him questions about the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.100, 
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l.24 - p.101, L.19.) She did not remember the exact content of the questions or of 
Mr. Hudson's replies. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.101, Ls.2-13.) 
On cross-examination, Officer Marley testified that she did not write anything 
about the Miranda warning in her report. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.102, Ls.3-12.) She 
probably did not think it was pertinent to the crime. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.102, Ls.13-
16.) However, Officer Marley was "100 percent certain" that Officer Klepich read 
Mr. Hudson his Miranda rights. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.102, Ls.17-20.) 
At the conclusion of the motion to suppress hearing, the district court found that 
Officer Klepich Mirandized Mr. Hudson, and then asked him questions about the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.106, Ls.2-7.) "Officer Klepich asked Mr. Hudson if he was driving 
the car, and Mr. Hudson ... said that he walked there, basically, then disavowing any 
connection to that car." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.106, Ls.8-15.) 
In determining whether reasonable suspicion supported the stop and 
investigative detention of Mr. Hudson, the district court held: 
When you take all of those factors into consideration - the initial 
observations and the conduct of the defendant, shortly thereafter seeing 
them run down, and when the officer gets out - and, in particular, the 
defendant hiding behind the planter - it gives the officer some concern 
that there is something afoot. And as the cases indicate, an officer can 
rely on evidence of flight to establish reasonable suspicion. 
That is coupled with the fact that we're in a high crime area, based 
upon the testimony of the officer. Again, simply being in a high crime 
area, in and of itself, is not sufficient for the stop. But the totality of all of 
these circumstances known to the officer at the time gives a basis for this 
officer to make the valid stop and detention. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.109, L.12-p.110, L.2.) 
The district then stated, "Once the warrant is discovered, obviously, there is an 
arrest." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.110, Ls.3-4.) Once the detention turned into an arrest, 
Mr. Hudson was subject to being Mirandized: "Miranda is particularly important here in 
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that, if he was not Mirandized, the disavowment, in this Court's opinion, would not be 
admissible and would be suppressible because it's a statement that could be used 
against him, whatever the fashion." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.110, Ls.4-11.) However, the 
district court determined that Mr. Hudson had been Mirandized. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.110, Ls.12-13.) "And so he's waived the privilege against self-incrimination in relation 
to those statements that were made after questioning and having been Mirandized." 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.110, Ls.14-16.) The district court then held, "And where he 
disavows the ownership or having driven the vehicle there, he does not have standing 
to challenge the search of the vehicle." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.110, Ls.17-19.) 
In sum, the district court held that the stop was lawful, that Miranda warnings 
were given and Mr. Hudson's statements would be admissible, and that Mr. Hudson did 
not have standing to challenge the search of the van. (R., p.140.) The district court 
also held that the pipe found in the van was in "plain view" and that Officer Klepich had 
authority to seize the pipe as evidence. (R., p.140.) Thus, the district court denied the 
motion to suppress. (R., p.140.) 
Mr. Hudson and the State subsequently entered into an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 
binding plea agreement. (R., pp.227-29.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Hudson 
agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of possession with intent to deliver 
(methamphetamine), felony, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). (R., p.227.) The 
injury to a jail charge would be dismissed. (R., p.227.) The parties would jointly 
recommend, and the district court would impose, a unified sentence of twelve years, 
with two years fixed. (R., p.227.) Mr. Hudson reserved the right to appeal the district 
court's decision on the motion to suppress. (R., p.227.) The plea agreement was 
intended to be binding on the district court. (R., p.228.) 
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Mr. Hudson then pleaded guilty by way of an Alford plea4 to the possession with 
intent to deliver count. (R., pp.218-19; Tr., Dec. 5, 2012, p.20, L.22 - p.26, L.21.) The 
district court accepted the guilty plea. (R., p.219.) Pursuant to the binding plea 
agreement, the district court later entered a judgment of conviction imposing a unified 
sentence of twelve years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.240-42.) 
Mr. Hudson then filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.243-46.) 
Mr. Hudson also filed, pro se, an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) 
motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., pp.255-57.) He subsequently filed an affidavit 
in support of the Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.261-63.) The district court denied the Rule 35 
motion. (Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Rule 35 Relief, May 2, 2013.) On 
appeal, Mr. Hudson does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion.5 
4 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
5 The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "a defendant requesting reduction of a 
stipulated sentence must show that his motion is based upon unforeseen events that 
occurred after entry of his guilty plea or new information that was not available and 
could not, by reasonable diligence, have been obtained by the defendant before he 
pleaded guilty pursuant to the agreement." State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 485 
(Ct. App. 1997). "The defendant must also show that these unanticipated developments 
are of such consequence as to render the agreed sentence plainly unjust." Id. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, because the 
detention of Mr. Hudson and subsequent search of the van were in violation of 
Mr. Hudson's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hudson's Motion To Suppress, Because 
The Detention Of Mr. Hudson And Subsequent Search Of The Van Were In Violation Of 
His Constitutional Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hudson asserts that Officer Klepich did not have reasonable suspicion that 
he was involved in any criminal activity when the officer detained him. Additionally, 
Mr. Hudson asserts that the warrantless search of the van was not justified by the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the detention of Mr. Hudson and 
subsequent search of the van violated Mr. Hudson's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court erred in denying Mr. Hudson's 
motion to suppress the evidence seized. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court has outlined the applicable standard of review as 
follows: "When reviewing a motion to suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated. 
This Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous. This Court freely reviews the trial court's application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86 (2009). 
C. Officer Klepich Detained Mr. Hudson In Violation Of His Constitutional Right To 
Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures, Because The Officer Did 
Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify His Investigatory Detention 
Mr. Hudson asserts that his investigatory detention by Officer Klepich violated his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, because 
Officer Klepich did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the detention. 
16 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures conducted by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Idaho Const Art. I, § 17. The federal safeguard has been incorporated through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United State Constitution to apply 
to the states. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643,655 (1961 )). "Evidence obtained in violation of the amendment generally may not 
be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal government action." Id. at 810-11. 
This "exclusionary rule" applies to both "evidence obtained directly from the illegal 
government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original 
illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 811. "The test is 'whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
has been come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by means sufficient 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."' Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471,488 (1963) (alteration in original)). In other words, "evidence that 
is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal government action may be admitted at trial." Id. 
"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that 
the search or seizure in question was reasonable." Id. 
The requirement that searches or seizures must be reasonable applies to brief 
investigatory detentions. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). ''To determine 
whether such seizures are reasonable, courts first ask 'whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception."' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). "The level of 
justification required depends on the intrusiveness of the seizure." Id. Courts then 
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consider whether the investigatory detention "'was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20.) 
While seizures must normally be based on probable cause to be reasonable, 
"limited investigatory detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible 
when justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, or is 
about to commit, a crime." Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-500 (1983)). 
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational 
inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. 
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (Ct. App. 2003)). Although the quantity and quality of 
information required to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that required to 
establish probable cause, "reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or 
'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion."' Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
330 (1990)). "Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based 
on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the 
stop." Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); Sheldon, 139 
Idaho at 983). 
Officer Klepich seized Mr. Hudson when he told Mr. Hudson that he was being 
detained and handcuffed him. See State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004) ("This 
Court has held that a seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only 
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen." (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The district court found that, at the time Officer Klepich seized Mr. Hudson, the officer 
knew the following information: 
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1) Mr. Hudson avoided eye contact or seemed to hide his identity from Officer 
Klepich when the officer was driving by on patrol; 
2) Officer Klepich later saw Mr. Hudson and the second male subject running 
down Ridge Street; 
3) When Officer Klepich made contact with Mr. Hudson, Mr. Hudson was hiding 
almost on his belly behind a planter; 
4) Mr. Hudson was sweating when Officer Klepich contacted him; 
5) Mr. Hudson acted like he wanted to get away when Officer Klepich contacted 
him; and 
6) Officer Klepich had been patrolling in a high crime area. 
(See Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.108, L.12-p.110, L.2.) 
Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, Officer Klepich did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hudson was involved in any criminal activity to justify his 
detention. At best, Officer Klepich only had a "mere hunch" that Mr. Hudson was 
involved in criminal activity. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. Officer Klepich testified 
that, at the point when he decided to detain Mr. Hudson, "I didn't know who he was. I 
didn't know what he was up to." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.11, Ls.17-18.) He later testified 
that he did not want Mr. Hudson to leave based on "[t]he culmination of the events and 
the behavior that he was exhibiting." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.12, Ls.21-23.) Officer 
Klepich further testified that, at the time he detained Mr. Hudson, "I hadn't observed any 
actual law being broken, other than some suspicious behavior." (Tr., Sept 11, 2012, 
p.32, Ls.20-21.) He had already seen Mr. Hudson running, and "was concerned that he 
was going to try to run again." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.36, Ls.12-14.) The officer 
detained Mr. Hudson "[b]ecause, at this point, the combination of his behavior on Maple 
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Street, running down Ridge Street [and] hiding behind the planter at the apartment 
complex warranted a little further investigation." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.36, Ls.10-19.) 
Officer Klepich's testimony reveals that nothing more than an "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion" was the basis for the investigatory detention of Mr. Hudson. 
See White, 496 U.S. at 330. However, this "mere hunch" may not serve as justification 
for the detention. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. Because the investigatory detention 
was not justified by a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Hudson was involved in any 
criminal activity, Officer Klepich detained Mr. Hudson in violation of his constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 810-11. 
Further, Mr. Hudson asserts that the evidence obtained as a result of the 
subsequent warrantless search of the van was discovered through exploitation of 
Officer Klepich's illegal investigatory detention. The exclusionary rule applies to 
"evidence discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the 
poisonous tree." Id. at 811; see a/so Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. 'To determine 
whether to suppress evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree, the court must inquire 
whether the evidence has been recovered as a result of the exploitation of that illegality 
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 
Page, 140 Idaho at 846 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the "attenuation 
doctrine," the three factors to consider when determining "whether the causal chain has 
been sufficient attenuated to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct" are: "(1) the 
elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the 
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the 
improper law enforcement action." Id. 
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Mr. Hudson asserts that the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless 
search of the van was come by through exploitation of the illegal investigatory detention, 
and therefore that evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Application of the attenuation doctrine factors calls for suppression of the evidence. 
Admittedly, the discovery of the warrant was an intervening circumstance that could 
favor attenuation. See id. at 846-47; State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734-35 (Ct. App. 
2005) ('The existence of an outstanding warrant for [the defendant's] arrest was an 
intervening circumstance and weighs in favor of a finding of attenuation."). However, 
the other two attenuation doctrine factors must be weighed to determine whether the 
taint of the illegal investigatory detention is sufficiently attenuated. See Bigham, 141 
Idaho at 734-35. 
The other two factors indicate that the taint of the illegal investigatory detention is 
not sufficiently attenuated, and thus favor suppression of the evidence in this case. 
With regard to the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the 
evidence, Officer Klepich did not testify as to how long it took to find out that Mr. Hudson 
had a warrant after he detained Mr. Hudson. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.14, Ls.3-6.) 
Additionally, the district court made no findings of fact as to how long it took the officer 
to learn that Mr. Hudson had a warrant. (See Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.105, Ls.8-10.) 
Considering the officers did not search the van until after they discovered that 
Mr. Hudson had a warrant, an undetermined amount of time elapsed between the 
detention and the search of the van. Thus, the State will not be able to show that the 
time between the illegal investigatory detention and the search of the van weighs in 
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favor of a finding of attenuation.6 Cf. Page, 140 Idaho at 846 ("Here, there was a 
minimal lapse of time between the seizure of the license and the search pursuant to a 
valid arrest warrant."); Bigham, 141 Idaho at 735 ("[T]he encounter, from initial contact 
to arrest, lasted only a few minutes."). The elapsed time factor indicates that the taint of 
the illegal investigatory detention is not sufficiently attenuated. 
The third factor-the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement 
action-also indicates that the taint of the illegal investigatory detention is not 
sufficiently attenuated in this case. Officer Klepich's conduct was flagrant enough to tilt 
the scales against attenuation. As explained above, his "mere hunch" that criminal 
activity was afoot may not serve as justification for the detention. See Bishop, 146 
Idaho at 811. But based on that mere hunch, Officer Klepich detained Mr. Hudson, 
handcuffed him, and held him for an undetermined amount of time before the warrant 
was discovered. (See Tr., Sept 11, 2012, p.11, L.17 - p.14, L.6.) This flagrant conduct 
indicates that that the taint of the illegal investigatory detention is not 
sufficiently attenuated. 
Thus, application of the attenuation doctrine factors calls for suppression of the 
evidence. Because the taint of the illegal investigatory detention is not sufficiently 
attenuated, the evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of the van was 
come by through exploitation of the illegal investigatory detention, and that evidence 
should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
In sum, the district court erred in denying Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, 
because the investigatory detention violated his constitutional right to be free from 
6 The State has the burden of showing the admissibility of evidence challenged under 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See State v. Bainbridge, 117 Idaho 245, 
250 (1990). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures. The evidence obtained as a result of the 
subsequent warrantless search of the van should be suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. The district court's judgment of conviction should be vacated, the order 
denying Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress should be reversed, and this case should be 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
D. The Warrantless Search Of The Van Was In Violation Of Mr. Hudson's 
Constitutional Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures, 
Because It Was Not Justified By An Exception To The Warrant Requirement 
Mr. Hudson asserts that the officers' subsequent search of the van violated his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, because the 
search was not justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 
1. Mr. Hudson Has Standing To Challenge The Warrantless Search Of The 
Van 
As a threshold matter, Mr. Hudson asserts that he has "standing" to challenge 
the warrantless search of the van.7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, as explained above, both 
prohibit unreasonable searches. "However, even if a search is improper, only an 
individual with a privacy interest invaded by the search may obtain suppression of the 
evidence detected." State v. Cutler, 144 Idaho 272, 273 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 716 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Fo/desi, 131 Idaho 778, 780 (Ct. App. 1998)). "A person challenging a 
7 The Idaho Court of Appeals has noted that the term "standing" is technically 
inaccurate in this context. State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 717 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"Nevertheless, the term is often employed as useful shorthand referring to whether the 
defendant had a privacy interest in a place that was searched such that he or she is 
entitled to the exclusion of the resulting incriminating evidence." Id. 
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search has the burden of showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the item or place searched." State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008) (citing 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)). "That involves a two-part inquiry: (1) 
Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?" Id. 
(citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 
473 (2001)). 
Mr. Hudson asserts that he has standing to challenge the warrantless search of 
the van, because he did not abandon the van prior to the search and he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the van. "One who voluntarily abandons property 
prior to the search cannot be said to possess the requisite privacy interest." State v. 
Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 52 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 
241 (1960)); see United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 543-45 (4th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Gomez, 16 F.3d 254, 256-57 (8th Cir. 1994). "Abandonment, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, occurs through words, acts, or other objective facts indicating the 
defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in his 
property." Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52. 
Here, the district court found that Officer Klepich went to the van after 
handcuffing Mr. Hudson and taking him to Officer Marley's vehicle. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.105, Ls.8-14.) Officer Klepich went to the van because Ms. Sandoval had called 
dispatch and indicated that she had some issues with a van on her property and wanted 
it removed. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.105, Ls.15-18.) Officer Klepich then saw a glass 
pipe through the window of the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.105, L.24 - p.106, L.1.) 
According to the district court, Officer Klepich later Mirandized Mr. Hudson and began 
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asking him questions about the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.106, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Hudson 
disavowed any connection to the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.106, Ls.8-15.) The district 
court held, "And where he disavows the ownership or having driven the vehicle there, 
he does not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle." (Tr. Sept. 11, 2012, 
p.110, Ls.17-19.) "And the Court has also determined that the - that Miranda was 
properly given, and the statements were therefore made - or made thereafter and are 
admissible and therefore, because of the disavowment of the ownership of the van, 
does not have standing to challenge that. He's waived that standing." (Tr., Sept 11, 
2012, p.110, L.4.) 
By holding that Mr. Hudson did not have standing to challenge the search of the 
van because he disavowed the ownership of the van, the district court essentially 
determined that Mr. Hudson had abandoned the van for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. See Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52. However, the standard articulated by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in Harwood is that "[o]ne who voluntarily abandons property 
prior to the search cannot be said to possess the requisite privacy interest." Id. 
(emphasis added). Here, Officer Klepich testified that he opened the van after seeing 
the methamphetamine pipe through the window, and found the wallet and drug 
paraphernalia inside the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.18, L.25 - p.20, L.3.) Officer 
Klepich testified that only after that search did he go back to Mr. Hudson, who told the 
officer that he had nothing to do with the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.20, Ls.4-25.) 
Thus, Mr. Hudson did not voluntarily abandon the van prior to the search. See 
Harwood, 133 Idaho at 52. Because Mr. Hudson did not abandon the van prior to the 
search, he may still demonstrate that he had the requisite legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the van (i.e., that he has standing) to challenge the search. 
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Indeed, Mr. Hudson had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the van. First, 
Mr. Hudson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the van. See Pruss, 145 Idaho at 
626. Whether a defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the item or place 
searched is an issue of fact. Id.; see Donato, 135 Idaho at 471-72. The facts of this 
case establish that Mr. Hudson had a subjective expectation of privacy in the van. At 
the time of the search, the van was parked on the street with its doors closed. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.1.) Thus, Mr. Hudson manifested his 
subjective expectation of privacy in the van. 
Second, Mr. Hudson's subjective expectation of privacy in the van was one that 
society would be willing to recognize as reasonable. See Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626. 
Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable is an issue of law. Id. "Stated 
differently, 'the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the 
personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment."' Id. (quoting 
Oliverv. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984)). The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
recognized that "[o]ther jurisdictions have recognized a non-owner driver's legitimate 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle if the driver was in some way authorized to control 
the vehicle," and that "[s]uch authorization has been held to include ... permission from 
the owner to borrow the car, permission from another person believed to have authority 
over the car, or a history of use from which a presumption of permission can be drawn." 
State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
Mr. Hudson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van because he was 
a non-owner driver authorized to control the vehicle. Officer Klepich testified that the 
second male subject stated that he and Mr. Hudson had driven there in the van. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.24, Ls.12-14.) Ms. Rowe, the owner of the van, testified that 
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everybody in her family used the van, she had given her daughter Ms. Hudson authority 
to allow others to drive the van, and Mr. Hudson had driven the van before. 
(Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.50, L.15- p.51, L.3.) Ms. Rowe also testified that she had never 
told Mr. Hudson about her wish that he not drive the van, and that she was pretty sure 
that Ms. Hudson had not told Mr. Hudson he could not drive the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 
2012, p.51, Ls.8-21.) Additionally, Ms. Hudson testified that the van was a family 
vehicle, that Mr. Hudson had driven the van, and that Ms. Rowe had never told her that 
Mr. Hudson could not use the van. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.59, L.25 - p.60, L.11.) 
Ms. Hudson further testified that, while she never specifically told Mr. Hudson he could 
use the van, she left the keys on the microwave for him and other family members to 
use. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.63, Ls.8-12.) 
Thus, Mr. Hudson was authorized to control the van. Even if Ms. Rowe had not 
given him express permission to drive the van, Mr. Hudson, through Ms. Hudson 
leaving the keys where he could use them, had "permission from another person 
believed to have authority over the [van, United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 
1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 2003)]." See Hanson, 142 Idaho at 719. At the least, Mr. Hudson 
had "a history of use from which a presumption of permission can be drawn, United 
States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983)." See Hanson, 142 Idaho at 
719. Because Mr. Hudson was authorized to control the vehicle, he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the van. 
Considering Mr. Hudson had a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
would be willing to recognize as reasonable, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the van. Put otherwise, Mr. Hudson has standing to challenge the warrantless search 
of the van. 
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2. The District Court Erred When It Determined That The Warrantless 
Search Of The Van Was Reasonable. Because The Plain View Exception 
Does Not Apply To Warrantless Searches 
Mr. Hudson asserts that the district court erred when it determined that the 
warrantless search of the van was reasonable, because the plain view exception does 
not apply to warrantless searches. Rather, Officer Klepich's observation of the 
methamphetamine pipe through the van window comes under the open view doctrine. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the distinctions between the plain view 
exception and the open view doctrine: 
The plain view exception allows police officers to make warrantless 
seizures of evidence viewed from a location where the officer has a right 
to be. Harlan v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 
112 (1990). Thus, the plain view·exception applies to warrantless 
seizures of readily visible items, not warrantless searches. Warrantless 
searches are properly analyzed under the open view doctrine. 
Under the open view doctrine, a police officer's observations made 
from a location open to the public do not constitute a search. This is 
because one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what is 
knowingly exposed to public view. 
State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146 (1997). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also discussed the plain view exception and the 
open view doctrine: 
[T]he plain view doctrine refers only to the circumstances where an officer 
has a prior justification for an intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area or activity and in the course of that intrusion spots and seizes 
incriminating evidence. Examples of such prior justifications include a 
search warrant for another object, hot pursuit, and a search incident to an 
arrest. Accordingly it is warrantless seizures of readily visible items, not 
warrantless searches, that are limited by the criteria delineated under the 
plain view doctrine. 
The validity of a law enforcement officer's mere observation of 
objects or activities requires a different analysis. If the officer intruded into 
an area where a privacy interest exists in order to gain the view, the 
intrusion must be justified by one of the recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. However, a policeman's mere observation from a 
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vantage point that does not infringe upon a privacy interest, of something 
open to public view, normally implicates no Fourth Amendment constraints 
because observation of items readily visible to the public is not a "search." 
This Court and others have used the term "open view doctrine" to 
refer to this rule that no Fourth Amendment "search" occurs where a law 
enforcement officer observes incriminating evidence or unlawful activity 
from a non-intrusive vantage point. 
State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 312-13 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Clark went on to state, "An open view 
observation alone, absent exigent circumstances or other Fourth Amendment 
justification, does not authorize a warrantless seizure or entry into an area where a 
privacy interest does exist. However, what is seen in open view may furnish probable 
cause for obtaining a warrant." Id. at 313 n.3 (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 
n.4 (1983); 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure,§ 2.2(a) (2d ed. 1987)). 
The district court in this case held: "As far as the pipe being seen in the vehicle, it 
was in plain view. And so even if the defendant had standing to challenge the search 
because it was in plain view, the officer had the authority to seize that evidence and 
contraband from the vehicle." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.111, Ls.13-18.) According to the 
district court, "regardless of whether the hat and the wallet were in and out of the van 
before or after is not relevant to whether the officer had seen the pipe through the 
window." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.112, Ls.2-5.) "And so, therefore, the pipe was in plain 
view and that evidence seized during the search of that vehicle meets the exception to 
the warrant requirement and will not be suppressed." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.112, Ls.5-
8.) The district court later repeated, "And even if there was standing, the plain view 
doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement, which does not justify suppression 
of the evidence as well." (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.112, Ls.12-15.) 
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The district court did not recognize that the plain view exception does not apply 
here. Officer Klepich saw the methamphetamine pipe from outside the van while he 
was on a public street. (Tr., Sept. 11, 2012, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.14.) The plain view 
exception would not apply to the officers' subsequent warrantless search of the van. 
See Christensen, 131 Idaho at 146. Officer Klepich did not see the pipe under 
"circumstances where an officer has a prior justification for an intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area or activity and in the course of that intrusion spots and 
seizes incriminating evidence." See Clark, 124 Idaho at 312-13. Thus, the district court 
erred when it held that the search of the van was reasonable, because the plain view 
exception does not apply to warrantless searches. 
In State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that an officer's observation through a car window of a lighter and a spoon with 
what appeared to be heroin residue in its bowl was not a search under the open view 
doctrine. Id. at 322-23. However, the officer's subsequent taking of the spoon from the 
car constituted a warrantless seizure that had to be justified through one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 323. The plain view exception would not 
have justified the taking of the spoon, because the officer did not have a prior 
justification for entering the car, a constitutionally-protected area. See Clark, 124 Idaho 
at 313. 
The Ramirez Court held that the vehicle exception, "which permits the 
warrantless search of a vehicle providing the officer has probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband which he is entitled to seize," justified the officer's intrusion 
into the car and seizure of the spoon. Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 322-23. The Court 
explained that probable cause "merely requires that the facts available to the officer 
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would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that certain items may be 
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime .... " Id. at 323. The 
record established that the officer had made a previous arrest for possession of heroin, 
knew what the substance looked like, and was aware of the practice of melting heroin in 
an ordinary spoon prior to injection. Id. at 323. The Court concluded "that this showing 
demonstrates a level of experience adequate to support the officer's reasonable belief 
that the spoon he observed was drug paraphernalia," giving the officer the requisite 
probable cause to satisfy the vehicle exception. Id. Thus, the Ramirez Court held "that 
the officer's intrusion into the vehicle and seizure of the spoon were constitutionally 
permissible, and we uphold the district court's ruling denying the motion to 
suppress." Id. 
Mindful of the open view doctrine and Ramirez, Mr. Hudson asserts that the 
district court erred when it determined that the warrantless search of the van was 
reasonable, because the plain view exception does not apply to searches. The district 
court's judgment of conviction should be vacated, the order denying Mr. Hudson's 
motion to suppress should be reversed, and this case should be remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Hudson respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's order denying 
Mr. Hudson's motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 2y!h day of September, 2013. 
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BEN PATRICK MCGREEvP 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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